Twenty-six states mandated coverage. Four states (15%) required scientific peer review for all studies. For 20 states (80%), an approved investigational new drug qualified as scientific review. In 10 states (38%), institutional review board (IRB) approval could replace scientific review. Twenty-four states (92%) permitted trials without academic medical connection. All states covered privately insured patients; seven (27%) included government and Medicaid patients. Fourteen states (54%) covered phase I to phase IV trials. Sixteen states (62%) covered treatment trials only; one (4%) covered prevention, detection, treatment, and palliation. Thirteen states (50%) covered research-related injuries. Only seven states (27%) required IRB approval. Three states (12%) required commensurate risks and benefits; 23 (88%) had no standard. Eight states (31%) required clinical equipoise with standard care; eight (31%) had no standard; and remaining states (46%) had unique standards. Two states (8%) addressed publication or registries.
Because clinical trials are "experimental," payer policies commonly exclude payment for costs of clinical care associated with the trial, even if the care would have been required for standard treatment. Some payers deny payment for complications that arise for trial participants, whether adverse events unique to the research or medical events, such as infections, that would ordinarily be covered. Such payer denials, therefore, shift health-care costs that may be substantial to trial participants at the very time that they are dealing with their cancer prognosis and treatment, adding to family tension and disruption. Such insurance policies leave clinicians and health-care institutions, who are motivated to innovate by their commitment to their patients, without payment for either innovative patient care or the disciplined research that leads to measurable medical progress, unless they prevail in uncertain payer negotiations. In oncology, a field in which clinical trials are an important therapeutic option, obstacles to access mean fewer therapeutic choices for patients and clinicians. There is a potential scientific impact as well: patients' fears of personal exposure may impede researchers' efforts to enroll adequately powered studies unbiased by income. Systematically, barriers to participant access frustrate improvements in research-based knowledge essential to progress.
These issues led President Bill Clinton to direct the federal Medicare program to issue a special 2001 Medicare Coverage Determination (MCD) that authorized payments for the costs of routine care and research-related complications and for clinical trials that meet certain scientific and ethical criteria (1; http://www. cms.hhs.gov/transmittals/downloads/R126CIM.pdf; http://www. cms.hhs.gov/mcd/viewncd.asp?ncd_id=310.1&ncd_version=1& basket=ncd%3A310%2E1%3A1%3ARoutine+Costs+in+Clinical+ Trials). These criteria grew out of a 1998 report commissioned by the Institute of Medicine that urged Medicare, which had excluded coverage for experimental treatment, to cover care associated with clinical trials, emphasizing that independent scientific and ethical review would ensure that only trials of high scientific and ethical quality, structured to promote genuine scientific advances and protect human subjects, would be funded (2) . That review would also confirm that trials were well supported by preclinical and 
Background
In the United States, Medicare-eligible participants' costs for routine care and complications from cancer clinical trials are covered by Medicare, but other people depend on state insurance mandates to assure coverage.
Methods
State mandates were reviewed for requirements to assure trials' scientific and ethical soundness, whom they covered and omitted, scope, and coverage for participants' research-related injuries in addition to routine care costs.
clinical data, that potential participants' benefits and risks would be commensurate, and that funded trials would be reasonable options for participants compared with standard noninvestigational alternatives.
The MCD contained specific terms intended, at the time, to make these promises of scientific and ethical soundness a reality. It addressed scientific soundness by limiting coverage to "qualified" trials (ie, those trials that were "well supported" by available scientific and medical information or those that tested health outcomes of interventions in common use) and to trials that were appropriately designed to answer the research question, sponsored by a "credible organization or individual capable of executing the proposed trial successfully" and not unjustifiably duplicative. Trials had to test diagnostics or therapies on individuals who had been diagnosed with cancer-related conditions that were eligible for coverage under Medicare benefit categories. They had to be "therapeutic" in intention, designed principally to evaluate improvement in participants' health outcomes, conducted with scientific integrity, and they had to comply with regulations for protection of human subjects, including institutional review board (IRB) review. The MCD reflects that the Medicare program intended to develop a process for qualifying trials (although it never did). To allow coverage to begin promptly, the MCD established "interim" rules under which certain trials would automatically be "deemed" qualified. Automatically-eligible trials included trials funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and some other federal agencies (for which the funding process embedded scientific peer review), trials conducted by centers or cooperative groups designated by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) (similarly embedding scientific peer review), "trials conducted under an investigational new drug (IND) application" by which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) permitted clinical investigation of experimental drugs (evidently on the assumption that FDA review was robust enough, and corporate behavior candid enough, to always be on a par with NIH review), and trials exempt from FDA review provided that the investigators certified their compliance with Medicare criteria. Within the oncology community, the MCD has been perceived to be successful in promoting high-quality trials among elderly participants, at modest incremental cost (3, 4) . However, with the exception of a few special federal programs, the federal government left unaddressed the coverage concerns of the roughly 85% of the population not covered by Medicare (5, 6) . No federal statute mandates cancer trial coverage for the general population. Insurance industry regulation is a long-standing focus of state legislatures. States, on occasion, impose coverage mandates, that is, requirements that insurers, as a condition of doing business in that state, issue or offer insurance with prescribed parameters justified by public policy concerns, or lose the right to issue such insurance to all the subscribers within that state.
This gap remains to this date. Almost no state mandates coverage for all clinical trials. Oncology advocates, however, have been uniquely committed and successful at articulating the importance of payer coverage to cancer clinical trials, both to advance knowledge and to help patients. There are now multiple state provisions that require non-Medicare payers, such as private group insurers, managed care plans, and even other governmental payers like Medicaid, the federal and state program for those of low
CONtEXt AND CAVEAts

Prior knowledge
Few publications have examined state laws regarding insurance coverage for costs of cancer clinical trials in the United States, and none have addressed whether such provisions promote scientific and ethical quality.
Study design
Three online databases were searched for state-by-state information regarding clinical trial coverage, and each state's laws were reviewed directly.
Contribution
Only 26 states had enacted legislation concerning coverage of cancer clinical trial costs. Among these, most did not expressly require unbiased scientific review or ethical review. About half of them required coverage of only certain kinds of trials, under certain conditions. Very few required publication of results.
Implications
Compared with the federal 2001 Special Coverage Determination that authorized care associated with clinical trials for Medicare patients, the state laws that cover most Americans offer fewer protections to patients.
Limitations
Other laws may be applicable for some patients, and actual practice may deviate from what is mandated in each state.
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income, to provide coverage for patient clinical care costs associated with cancer clinical trials. However, states have responded to oncologists' urgings by addressing coverage in very different ways.
Only three well-known systematic studies have examined state laws regarding insurance coverage of oncology trial costs. In 2001, Bennett et al. (7) found that some states had already been experimenting with mandates that insurers who did business within their borders cover routine care costs in oncology trials. In 2003, McBride (8) reported an increase in state cancer trial coverage mandates. However, their impact, as measured by accrual increases since 2001, appeared to be modest, nonexistent, or unknown (depending on the state), perhaps, guessed some, because few participants were aware of them. Consistently, in 2004, Kelahan (9) published data from a 2003 review of 373 Web sites of cancer providers and advocacy organizations. Less than 5% of the sites informed potential participants about the clinical trials that the organizations participated in, of the patients' opportunity to participate, and of the fact that insurance coverage was available.
However, those studies were not directed at whether and how state provisions maintained the focus of the MCD on scientific and ethical soundness, whether through incorporating ethical principles, such as commensurate risks and benefits, or through conditioning coverage mandates on processes such as independent scientific and ethical review. Nor did they address the variety of state standards or explore the implications of various standards for patients, clinicians, and researchers. Some databases, discussed below, include state-specific limits on covered trial phases. But they do not address the extent to which states went beyond requiring coverage for routine care, such as clinically indicated laboratory tests and office visits that contribute to the trial, by requiring coverage for research-related injuries, like unexpected complications that are possibly related to a test drug. The study by Kelahan (9) looked at whether the scope of coverage extended beyond treatment trials to clinical research involving cancer prevention and detection; however, this was based on 2003 data, and since then, an additional category, palliation, has emerged with distinct emphasis.
Here, we assemble information concerning states' provisions for the scope of insurance policy coverage for cancer clinical trials and whether and how such provisions ensure scientific and ethical soundness. By illuminating the bases for payers' refusal to pay, payment conditions directly convey the costs that patients (and if patients fail to pay, clinicians and providers) will be responsible for and thus the financial disincentives that oppose innovative research-related treatment. These data also allow an assessment of how much variation in coverage exists and whether coverage is substantially different from that under a uniform national plan, such as Medicare. States' scientific and ethics or regulatory standards can indicate whether high-quality trials are being excluded and, conversely, whether coverage is available for trials that do not meet high scientific and ethical standards, signaling the need to create alternative mechanisms for scientific and ethical assessment. In reviewing state standards, it is important to take into account, as noted, how these standards have evolved.
Substantial variation from standards can indicate failures in state understanding of the complex intersection of academic research, biotechnology, and specialized care, and more generally of the regulatory context for clinical research, and the generations of thoughtful efforts by physicians, scientists and ethicists that it represents. Although the states have many models to work from (eg, each other's provisions and federal policies like the MCD), their varying unique solutions to a generally applicable problem may reflect positive experimentation, or instead a serious knowledge or engagement gap between clinical researchers and the legislative process, arbitrarily individual political narratives, or unique political resolutions of ubiquitous competing forces, such as the state-specific relative influence of payers, pharmaceutical companies, and hospitals, which may appear to leave policy soundness second to political muscle. Absent standards can indicate which policy aspects the states did not view as essential to address, in contrast with detailed or unique provisions, which signal matters of demonstrated state interest. Data about variation in states' provisions for insurance coverage may also help to reveal unknown factors affecting patient accrual to clinical trials-including, for example, whether the cost of unexpected side effects is covered or excluded; and how easily the trial is compared with alternatives, and then integrated, under known and easily applicable standards, with a patient's care options. The wording of some states' laws, aimed at insurance coverage for clinical research into treatment of lethal cancers, might, as a consequence, fail to require coverage or accrual for research on more treatable cancers. Finally, these data may suggest whether existing state approaches suffice to produce national coverage focused on high-quality clinical trials or whether extending coverage nationally, to mimic the national reach of the MCD, is a desirable goal. actually said, and not what a lawyer might argue they might mean in a given case. Thus, no substantial legal interpretation was required or used except in regard to one matter, research-related injuries. Some state provisions expressly state that complications and research-related injuries are covered. Those were counted as explicit coverage commitments for research-related injuries. Some provisions say simply that routine costs of care complementing the research interventions under the study protocol are covered and do not discuss research-related injuries. It is conceivable that, for various reasons, these provisions are being implemented to cover research-related injuries, but the opposite is equally conceivable, particularly because such statutes usually expressly state that they do not supplant sponsor coverage. For purposes of this study, the litmus test is what the state provision explicitly states. Finally, for costs, there is a third data category, "ACC" or "any covered cost," which means that the state provision does not speak in terms of routine costs, nor does it address research-related injuries, but requires coverage of clinical trial costs to the extent they fall within the policy and would be covered for standard treatment. This creates substantial ambiguity for research-related injuries that are unique to a given clinical trial because on their face they are not complications of standard treatment. ACC states are counted as such, and not as states that provide coverage for research-related injuries.
Methods
The survey was directed at three broad areas: scientific peer review requirements and clinical trial "qualification," scope of coverage, and basic principles of clinical research ethics. Specifically, the survey inquired, for a given state: 1) does the state mandate coverage for care associated with oncology clinical trials, through legislative enactment or state multiparty agreement? If so, 2) is scientific peer review explicitly required for coverage eligibility; 3) does FDA approval of an industry IND application suffice to qualify a study scientifically, without other independent scientific peer review; and 4) must a covered trial have some nexus with an academic medical center (given the likelihood that, even if scientific review were not expressly required, an academic medical center would require it through academic departments). Scope of coverage involved the following survey questions: 5) what are the regulated payers (eg, indemnity insurers, managed care organizations, Medicaid, state employee benefit plans); 6) what trial phases (I-IV) are covered; and 7) is coverage limited to treatment trials or does it also cover other kinds of clinical trial (eg, detection, prevention, or palliation)? Finally, concerning research ethical principles: 8) is IRB approval of trials required (or stated differently, as the mandate is written, need payers pay for clinical care costs associated with trials that are not IRB approved); 9) are there standards addressing the degree of risk, and the acceptable relationship between risks and benefits, for covered trials; 10) are there standards addressing whether coverage is affected by the availability of clinical alternatives; 11) does cost coverage explicitly include both routine clinical care associated with the study protocol and research-related injuries (typically reflected as coverage for injuries "arising" from the research or as "complications"); and 12) is there any required public dissemination of data, results or public impact, including unbiased publication of positive and negative trial results.
Neither the databases nor this study address case law, the body of judicial interpretations that is generated in the course of challenges to particular coverage denials or that calls for the interpretation of particular policies. Such judgments are often case-specific, partly involve a judge's individual discretion with respect to fact-finding and interpretation, and, as important as they are to a given patient, may or may not reflect the broad policy stance of the state government acting through its legislative, executive, or regulatory authority.
It also should be noted that some of the state provisions explicitly include Medicaid, the federal and state program for people of low assets and income, on the same terms as private payers. However, neither the databases nor the state provisions are uniformly directed at Medicaid coverage rules, and it should be emphasized that Medicaid rules would typically be found within guidance internal to each state's Medicaid program. It is notable when a state decides to apply the same standard to both private plans and Medicaid, by including both in the state legal mandate, because it indicates that the state is willing, as a policy matter, to require the same coverage regardless of wealth and regardless of whether private entities or the state itself is the payer. However, there are various ways in which Medicaid coverage can be affected, so that the absence of Medicaid from a state mandate is not conclusive concerning Medicaid coverage-there may be some alternative form of coverage within a state's Medicaid program. To examine Medicaid coverage nationally would reveal whether low-income individuals have differential access to clinical trials; however, given logistical limitations, such an analysis is for future research and outside the scope of this study.
results
Twenty-five states had current coverage mandates for cancer clinical trials, and one (Illinois) had an expired statute. There was wide variation among the states in terms of what costs and interventions are covered, and there was some variation in which phases of clinical trials are covered (Table 1) . Only a few states required scientific peer review for coverage of all trials, and most states did not directly address it, implicitly depending completely on federal agencies, IRBs, or even the interested companies or other granteligible "entities" conducting the trial to ensure scientific soundness, but without requiring that they do so or assessing the effect on covered trial quality. State laws revealed very limited incorporation of basic research ethical principles, such as mandatory IRB review and risk vs benefit standards. There was an extraordinary variety of unique state standards that specified how clinical trials must compare with noninvestigational alternative interventions to be covered. Requirements for review of the scientific soundness of trials, the kinds of trials that are covered, ethical protections for the patients involved, and the provisions for the publication of trial results were also listed on a state-by-state basis ( Table 2) .
Scope of Coverage
Fourteen of the 26 states with relevant statutes (54%) required payer coverage of clinical trial phases I through IV. However, this statistic understates the consensus among states on particular phases. All 26 states covered phase III, and all but one covered phase II. Phase IV was covered by 23 states (88%). The major divergence among states concerned phase I trials, which are not typically directed at therapeutic benefit: 15 states (58%) covered all phase I trials and the remainder did not. Among those states that cover phase I trials, however, were states with no standard for how a clinical trial compares with noninvestigational alternatives or requirement that it optimize clinical benefit (eg, California, Massachusetts, Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin), and with no standard for potential participant's benefits and risks being commensurate (California, Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin), although two of them did require a physician confirmation of the potential for participant benefit (Georgia and Tennessee). These findings suggested that further research be done to evaluate the robustness and independence of the physician assessment in Georgia and Tennessee and to compare which mechanisms, if any, exist in the other states to ensure that, in practice, covered phase I trials are clinically sound options for patients in those states. Sixty-two percent of the 26 states mandated coverage only for treatment-oriented trials, while five (19%) covered prevention, treatment, and palliation (Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, and Vermont) and four (15%) covered prevention, detection, and treatment (Maryland, Indiana, Missouri, and West Virginia). Only one state (New Mexico) covered the full range of prevention, detection, treatment, and palliation, although another state (Louisiana) finely parsed expanded coverage by covering treatment only, but in that full range of trials. Coverage was thus skewed against patient accrual-and clinical research advances-in methods of detection, prevention, and palliation, despite their importance to patients, clinicians, and researchers. By excluding payer coverage for trials aimed at detection and prevention of cancer, some states also eliminated support for studies that use genetic and genomic research to illuminate the impact of the environmental and lifestyle on cancer development unless these issues could be addressed as part of treatment trials. These state provisions therefore excluded potentially fruitful cutting-edge research aimed at transferring knowledge that has arisen from deciphering the human genome into prediagnosis management of cancer risks.
States varied in what payers were covered and who was eligible. Of the 26 states, only seven (California, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Vermont, and West Virginia) (27%) expressly included Medicaid; one addressed children through a special statute (Georgia); and one expressly excluded the state's health insurance program for children (New Hampshire). Seven (27%) expressly covered some segment of public employees (Georgia, Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia); one of those (Ohio) mandated coverage for only phases II and III for government employees, while mandating coverage for all four phases for the general population. Both government employee plans and Medicaid are draws on the states' own coffers. Only a minority of states covered trial participants from these groups under the same coverage mandates as participants with private insurance. As noted above, Medicaid program documents for each state were outside the scope of this study, as were government employee benefit plan documents. A definitive conclusion about whether these populations have reduced access nationally would require additional research.
Although 85% of the states covered routine clinical care costs associated with a research protocol, only 50% of the states expressly covered research-related injuries. Among these, one state (West Virginia) distinguished between complications that arise Table 1 . Here, the Georgia pediatric statute is included. † "All" indicates that the text of the provision explicitly requires scientific peer review, in addition to any other qualifying factors such as investigational new drug (IND) approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); "CG only" indicates that the only reference to independent scientific peer review is that which defines a cooperative group as one possible provider of a coverage-eligible trial. NCI = National Cancer Institute; NIH = National Institutes of Health; HHS = US Department of Health and Human Services. ‡ "Yes" means that FDA approval of an IND application suffices for scientific peer review; "No" means that IND does not suffice, either because peer review is additionally required or IND-approved studies are not coverage eligible. States that require scientific peer review will have "Not applicable" for the column about whether an IND suffices to qualify a study, even if FDA-approved studies are among those they will fund, given their explicit requirement for independent scientific peer review. § "Yes" means trial must be situated in or approved by an academic medical center; "No" means trial need not be situated in or approved by an academic medical center. ║ "Private" means provision includes group and/or individual health benefit plans, managed care organizations, preferred provider organizations, hospital or medical service organizations. It may include plans that, although privately operated, are open to participation by government employees. "GE" means that government employees are explicitly covered. CHIP = child health insurance program. ¶ TO = treatment only; PTP = prevention, treatment or palliation; PDT = prevention, detection, or treatment; PDTP = prevention, detection, treatment, or palliation; cnxn = connection. # CTC = routine clinical trial costs, variously defined; RRI = explicit coverage of complications and research-related injuries; ACC = any covered cost (ie, any cost that the plan would have covered for standard treatment-ambiguous whether research-related injuries unique to trial therapy are covered).
** "Yes" means provisions require an institutional review board (IRB) approval for trial to be covered, either by express reference or by reference to required compliance with federal human subject protection regulations (where noted); "No" means that there is no reference to required IRB approval. "Option" means IRB approval is not required, but IRB approval is an alternate means of qualifying a study scientifically and otherwise. AMC = Academic Medical Center; MPA = multiple project assurance; FWA = federal-wide assurance; OHRP = Office of Health Research Protection; reg = regulatory. † † "ALA" means available clinical and/or preclinical data provide a reasonable expectation that the treatment will be at least as efficacious/effective as noninvestigational alternatives. NCS = no clearly superior noninvestigational alternative; CTS = available clinical data provide reasonable expectation that clinical trial will be superior to clinical alternatives; BCR = benefits of trial to participant are commensurate with risks of trial. Federal regulatory compliance: addresses presence of ethical safeguards indirectly by requiring compliance with federal regulations re human subject protections; pt = patient. ‡ ‡ The Illinois statute is cited in all databases except that of NCI. during research because of the natural course of the disease or care, and research-related injuries unique to the research intervention, such as drug toxicity. West Virginia required insurers to cover the first and sponsors to cover the second. Some states (Arizona, Maine, New Mexico, and Wisconsin) mandated that payers cover any cost that the insured's policy would have otherwise covered for standard treatment. Researchrelated injuries unique to the trial are not standard. Unlike West Virginia, however, these states did not require sponsors to cover such costs; thus, there is a potential coverage gap for the participant and the researcher-clinician depending on whether the industry sponsor covered such research-related injuries voluntarily. Interestingly, no state except West Virginia mandated industry sponsors to cover such research-related injuries.
Many states specifically excluded coverage for costs often paid by industry sponsors, by either 1) explicit exclusion of costs, benefits, items, or services that were "customarily" or actually paid for by sponsors (California, Delaware, Georgia, Georgia pediatric statute, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming), or those that a sponsor might be "reasonably expected" to pay (Maine), or 2) general prohibition on supplanting industry costs (Arizona, Rhode Island [phase II only]) or a combination of both approaches (Illinois, Nevada, and New Mexico). In practice, industry sponsors often promise to cover research-related injuries, but not always. Even when industry coverage is offered, it may be focused just on product liability; it may impose strict standards for relatedness and certainty; it may be subject to conditions that are designed to allocate responsibility, based on fault, to the clinical provider; and it may impose administrative steps, such as prompt notice, on participants (who may be new to dealings with industry or industry insurers and may not know whether they are being treated for research-related conditions). By referring to "custom," which varies in practice, these state provisions left a participant uncovered in trials in which, despite general custom, there was not a broad and unconditional sponsor promise to cover costs for adverse events.
Scientific Soundness
In four states (15%; Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Vermont), scientific peer review was specifically required for any study to be included within the coverage mandate. In one other state (Maine), it was required indirectly because coverage was limited to NIH-funded and comparable studies.
All other states had a two-to four-tier approach to qualification of trials, under which they considered trials with distinct approval processes to be equally scientifically sound. All 26 states considered trials that are funded by federal agencies with strong programs of peer review, like the NIH, to be scientifically sound. Twenty-three (88%) of the states considered industry trials with an FDAapproved IND application to be scientifically sound. Ten states (38%) allowed IRBs to fully qualify oncology trials, including scientific merit; no oncology expertise was demanded, only that the IRB have a "multiple project assurance," a now-extinct form of written promise to the federal government to apply human subject protections to referenced trials. Ten states (38%) considered any trial approved by any "research entity" that meets NIH criteria for receiving grants to be scientifically sound. The reference here was not to cooperative groups funded by the NCI; this was an additional eligibility category. Since the NIH grant program was not specified, this could include almost any not-for-profit or small forprofit entity as long as it was a "research entity."
Standards of Research Ethics
IRBs play a critical role in permitting care to progress beyond what is already well established and accepted. When an intervention's efficacy is not well established by scientific proof, and its risks and benefits are open to inference, independent ethical review ensures that trials otherwise excluded by the standard of care, and not clearly excluded as quackery, can proceed with credibility through a multidisciplinary independent consensus that they respect the limits of appropriate risk that a participant could ethically consent to, and offer, in clear and accurate terms, reasonably appropriate choices for participants given their well-articulated alternatives.
Nonetheless, only seven states (27%) required IRB approval as a condition of mandating that the care costs of the trial be covered, whereas such independent ethical review is so fundamental that it ought to be explicit in all cases, as it was with the MCD. This underestimate of IRB's ethical importance, like the overestimate of IRBs' scientific power to provide specialized oncology assessments, points to a misunderstanding at the state level of the nature, history, composition, and function of IRBs, which, in being designed to ensure independent ethical review, are often dependent on others for potent scientific review. Of course, the FDA requires IRB review in many trials subject to its jurisdiction, as does the Department of Health and Human Services for trials funded by certain federal agencies, and it is conceivable some states, in omitting the requirement, knew of that fact. But if so, that means, at best, that they then made a deliberate decision to leave FDAexempt trials (such as some investigator-initiated trials not intended to lead to labeling changes, or novel, exempt postmarketing studies that assess comparative effectiveness, and have huge potential impact on industry sales) without any independent ethical review.
Ethical standards concerning risk and benefit, and comparing alternatives, are equally fundamental. The data that relate to ethical and clinical standards are therefore as intriguing. Remarkably, only three states (12%; Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Delaware) required trial benefits and risks to be commensurate or otherwise addressed relative risks and benefits, despite extraordinary importance of this issue for patients, and the enduring importance of such standards in federally funded trials (10) . By contrast, 18 (69%) of the states had a standard for comparing trial therapy with patient alternatives, and almost half of the states developed a unique standard, often, it appeared, by modifying the standards of other states. Eight states had adopted the precise standards of the MCD: that data support the conclusion that the trial will be "at least as effective as noninvestigational alternatives" and that none of those alternatives is clearly superior. But other states added on diverse requirements-more stringent than ethics literature or general practice would mandate-which therefore functioned as additional restrictions on coverage. The text of one state enactment (Missouri), in what must be a piece of legislative misdrafting that is hopefully corrected in implementation, required the impossible: that the trial treatment be superior to clinical alternatives and that the noninvestigational alternative be identical or superior.
Another (New Mexico) required the trial to be at least as effective as alternatives, that there be no noninvestigatory equivalent, and no better standard treatment. One state (North Carolina) required a specific finding that the trial be better for a given patient, but without requiring sponsors to make available data pertinent to such a judgment. Although various states required a determination of relative effectiveness compared with standard treatment-a liability-laden determination necessarily difficult to make in advance with precision and certainty-one state's enactment (Illinois) required that effectiveness compared with clinical alternatives be undetermined.
Most of these standards were inconsistent. Evidently, there was confusion among the states about how to address the relative advantages of accepted therapies, the degree to which such advantages must be certain, the data necessary to support the judgments, and whether patients' clinicians should be involved in making patient-specific enrollment judgments. Yet, defining the parameters of when trial coverage will be available in the context of clinical options-a key financial issue for payers-was evidently a matter of absorbing state interest.
Only seven states (Illinois, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, and Missouri) addressed reporting on results or impact of the coverage provisions. Two (Illinois and Vermont) required a state-sanctioned report on premium impact. One (New Hampshire) required payers and providers to share unspecified financial and clinical data. One (Connecticut) required a report on insurers' compliance. Three (Louisiana, Maryland, and Missouri) required a registry or list of clinical trials but did not require that results be posted. Only two state provisions required unhindered publication of trial results: one (Michigan) required that participating institutions have policies that protect publication of results; the other, now expired (Illinois), required publication in independently peer-reviewed national journals.
Many states created some form of immunity from liability, or liability-shift, but the provisions varied. Some laws protected just payers, but some, if the drafting is interpreted literally, may bar not only patient suits against payers, but also providers' suits against payers or sponsors. Among the narrower variety, for example, West Virginia required trial sponsors to "hold harmless" any payer for any losses and injuries sustained by a subscriber as a result of clinical trial participation; this meant, in essence, that if a payer were to get sued by one of its health plan members for injuries arising in connection with a trial for which the payer has provided coverage, the sponsor would have to pick up the damages. Tennessee had a similar rule, except that it was medical providers who must hold payers harmless. New Mexico and Arizona had examples of the kind of provision that may sweep most broadly. They required informed consent forms to exculpate "third parties" from liability by stating that "no third party is liable for damages for the treatment provided during any phase of a cancer clinical trial," although requiring subjects to waive rights in an informed consent form violates federal regulations.
Requiring participants to waive rights and creating special immunities are examples of how the states can act at cross-purposes to federal models in this area. In this case, such statutes contradict the model of the MCD and the model for appropriate ethical standards and regulations for clinical research. A final example is illustrated by West Virginia, which specially excludes coverage for trials intended to extend the patent of any existing drug, secure approval for a new metabolite or expand approved indications. What may have been motivated by a desire to avoid subsidies for "me too" drugs and strategic patent monopolies, however, might also exclude pediatric trials of drugs approved for adults because they are covered by various federal incentive programs, including patent extensions. This statute also illustrates how states, in their own legislation, can signal their refusal to accept regulatory and ethical imperatives widely accepted nationally or act to undercut federal policy objectives for research support.
Discussion
This study was undertaken to survey state laws regarding insurance coverage for patients involved in oncology clinical trials and to determine state requirements for scientific review, the scope of coverage in each mandate, and requirements for ethical review and results reporting. Briefly, we found that of the 26 states that mandated coverage of expenses arising from oncology clinical trials, only four (15%) explicitly required independent scientific peer review to qualify trials and 10 (38%) required only IRB approval. We also found that deviating from the MCD in other respects was the norm, not the exception, whether through risk-benefit standards, comparison with noninvestigational alternatives, coverage for research-related injuries, and other aspects of coverage scope. Transparency in methods and results is the exception not the rule, and payer mandates were enacted and continued without regard for the major forces that have led, on the one hand, toward research registries disclosing both negative and positive results, and on the other, toward prohibiting certain industry practices, scrutinizing investigator conflicts of interest, greater independence in scientific and ethical review of industry-sponsored research, and reports and reforms directed at the FDA.
When Medicare promulgated the MCD, it gave states a model for focusing payment on high-quality clinical trials intended to benefit patients as well as advance knowledge. Certain of its elements, such as IRB review, risk vs benefit standards, and a reasonable relationship to clinical alternatives, were well established then as ethical essentials and remain well established, as demonstrated by their incorporation in regulations for human subject protection in federally funded trials and their wide presence in the scientific and ethical literature and in some journal publication standards.
Other ethical principles have only recently become more prominent, among them, the principles that, to be ethical, clinical trials should always receive independent scientific peer review and that clinical trials should be registered and their positive and negative results made public. These requirements were included, for example, the year before the MCD was issued, in the widely cited 2000 paper of Emanuel et al. (11) , which distilled succinct fundamental principles from an extensive review of the clinical trial and research ethics literature and leading association guidelines. Since the time of the MCD, of course, the registration of many trials through clinicaltrials.gov has become mandatory, and results reporting has moved from the subject of academic commentaries and political hearings to federal statutory changes, as discussed below. For that reason, this survey looked at presence of peer review and reporting requirements in state laws regarding cancer clinical trials, even though their prominence is more recent than some state provisions.
Several definite findings emerge from this study. The first is that almost no states required independent scientific review. IRB review does not adequately address this need; it is not required for FDA-exempt trials, and for other trials, the sufficiency of nonspecialist IRBs to assess scientific merit in specialized oncology trials is doubtful. Although they must, by federal regulation, assure some level of scientific validity, IRBs are not designed to conduct or substitute for specialized scientific peer review and are ill equipped to monitor safety risks (12, 13) .
Whereas most states allowed an approved IND to qualify a trial, this standard has become questionable in light of recent developments. In 2001, the prevailing view was that FDA review of industry trials independently assured scientific rigor. The MCD treated such industry trials as equivalent in scientific soundness to NCI trials and other NIH-funded trials (http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ mcd/viewncd.asp?ncd_id=310.1&ncd_version=1&basket=ncd% 3A310%2E1%3A1%3ARoutine+Costs+in+Clinical+Trials). Since then, major industry sponsors have been criticized as unreliable in truth-telling to clinicians, the public, and journals, and the FDA has come to be perceived as weak and ineffective in remedying industry lapses. Literature since the MCD has questioned the reliability of industry-reported data, given demonstrated bias and withholding of negative data (although the data suggest less bias in reporting industry-sponsored oncology trials than those for other illnesses) (14, 15) . Journals and government oversight bodies have severely criticized the strength and independence of FDA review, including in broad indictments of FDA relationships with industry (16,17), in Inspector General reports condemning FDA safety monitoring, postmarketing review and oversight of investigator conflicts of interest (18) , and in congressional oversight hearings. These developments have led the current editor-in-chief of JAMA, for example, and the past editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, to call, in all cases of industry sponsorship, for scientific review that is independent of industry and the FDA (14, 17, 19) . The survey question on the scientific sufficiency of an IND was directed to whether state provisions reflect these dramatic changes. In reviewing each state provision, the author was also alert to any other change or amendment related to peer review for industry trials. No state amended its statute in any way to impose different or additional requirements for industry trials or in relation to FDA review.
This study therefore demonstrates that most states depend on federal agencies, such as the NIH or FDA, and federal regulations (to the extent they apply) for basic guarantees of scientific and ethical soundness and that most states do not differentiate between different kinds of trials that differ fundamentally in the scientific review that they embed and require. The states' dependence on federal agencies ought to reinforce current efforts to sustain a strong FDA; only four states (or five, if you include the indirect effect in Maine) ensure that there is a safety net of required peer review in all governed trials. This raises the question of whether relying on industry and the FDA, alone, is the best long-term strategy for maintaining the public trust in research that is necessary both for individual participation in clinical trials and for social decisions to support research (eg, through federal tax dollars). It also raises the question of whether a comprehensive scientific peer review safety net beyond the FDA could come to exist within the system of oncology clinical research practice. Two states required trials to occur in or affiliated with academic medical centers. However, academic medical centers are not positioned under current state provisions to perform scientific review for all trials, regardless of venue, and limiting trials to such centers would of course dramatically interfere with the availability of trials through community sites and impede participant access. We are left with the question of how independent assurance of scientific soundness can be ensured in diverse clinical and research settings when industry disclosure and FDA review are viewed, at least at this point in time, as less than consistently reliable, and when payer coverage provisions do not assess or implement such independent review. It is obviously problematic to depend on payers, who have limited information and their own financial incentives, to ensure such review. If oncologists themselves do not organize to provide such deep and independent review in appropriate cases, perhaps in relationship with the NCI, it is difficult to imagine how it will be provided.
Second, fewer than half of the states provided for mandatory coverage, and those that did provide coverage varied substantially in scope, standards, and conditions. While cancer and many cancer trials are national or international in scope, coverage is not. Indeed, for a typical multisite trial, it is likely that coverage will vary in substantial ways among participants based not just on their individual coverage, but larger patterns reflecting state enactments. Each state is its own universe. And yet, notably absent from the list of states that mandated coverage, for example, were New York and Texas, major sources of cancer care and research. In New York, coverage was not mandated, but an external appeal of a payer's denial was available, under Chapter 586 of the Laws of 1998, if coverage were denied for clinical trial care for life-threatening and disabling conditions and no effective standard treatment were available. Such appeals are not coverage guarantees; like any utilization review, their impact in practice would depend on the review agents, the interpretation of standards and medical evidence, and the support for state enforcement. However, it may be possible that, at least in some states, some combination of intense market competition among payers, alternative regulatory approaches, and more generous sponsor coverage (to reach substantial participant volume or respond to provider negotiating leverage) may result in effective coverage, even without a coverage mandate. If so, then, as Kelahan (9) wrote in 2004, the Web sites informing patients about state coverage, including the prominent databases of the NCI and ACS cited in this study, might be usefully amended to more fully inform patients who might otherwise believe that they would not be covered or protected even partly.
Given that the states had the MCD and other state provisions as potential models, it is striking that states' activity, in drafting their own legislation after what is textually evident review of other enactments, mostly consisted of striking provisions like those in the MCD directed to trial quality, such as IRB review; and adding conditions requiring comparison with noninvestigational alternatives or that there be no effective standard treatment that would further restrict the mandate. Of course, states also made their own important policy judgments, such as whether to cover prevention, detection, and palliation in addition to treatment, but the majority of states adopted narrower coverage.
Another example of states' limitations of coverage is what many of them did to weaken coverage for research-related injuries in contrast with the explicit federal government coverage in the MCD. In 2001, coverage for research-related injuries was not required by federal regulations. To this date, the regulations only require clarity about whether such medical care is available for research involving more than minimal risk, and, when the IRB thinks it is appropriate, whether there are any additional costs to the subject (20). But the MCD decision to cover research-related injuries reflected a long lineage of recommendations, such as those by the Institute of Medicine, two federally chartered ethics bodies and the medical ethics literature. These concluded that research participants should be covered for research-related injuries because 1) fairness and justice require that, in promoting societal benefits, participants not solely bear care costs; 2) eliminating coverage uncertainty for severe and costly complications is practically and ethically important to address patient fears; 3) access to clinical trial remedies should not depend on income or correlated demographics like gender and race; 4) coverage is essential for public trust; and 5) the medical malpractice system fails as a device for effective risk management and comprehensive redress (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) . By contrast, the data herein show that the states have sidestepped repeated policy recommendations of the medical community and left the relative responsibilities of payers and industry sponsors unresolved-for clinicians and patients to navigate in each case.
Whereas two states required reports on the impact of clinical trial coverage on insurance premiums, no state required an evaluation of the impact on trial accrual or patients' options and whether the state provisions actually left patients and clinicians in a better position. That impact would presumably depend on the quality of the trials, as well as the quality of the researcher and clinician judgments comparing the trials with alternatives, under states' own sometimes-complex standards. It would also depend on insurer compliance. The ideal state provision might have included data collection and resources to assess its impact in the broadest sense, but no state did that.
Third, the study suggests that most states have not considered it important to require that trial results be disseminated. Results reporting from clinical trials is key to the social goal that justifies them: the increase of knowledge. But from a practical perspective, results reporting is important to ensure that clinicians have accurate knowledge about contraindications and harm, and patients have information about the risks and potential benefits of their options as trial participants. Despite the practical utility of realtime information about clinical trial results (eg, whether the results of earlier phases or preliminary limited results from a current trial), only two states have directly required or protected publication of results. Even the states that require a physician to attest that a participant will benefit compared with clinical alternatives-an inherently difficult judgment-do not require industry sponsors to make available data pertinent to that judgment. While some states require "available" data to be supportive, no state prohibits selective availability of data or ensures that all data pertinent to assessing risks, benefits, and alternatives are actually available to clinicians and oncology patients weighing their options. None of the state-required registries or trial listings require negative information to be disclosed.
Recent legislation mandates the FDA to promulgate registry regulations that require disclosure of certain results for drugs and devices after approval (and certain existing results and FDA reviews), but whether results will be required for drugs and devices that are not approved was left open (27) . Only time will tell whether the FDA, and states, will ensure that clinicians and participants have access, in a conveniently accessible and interpretable form, to comprehensive ongoing negative and positive data or to underlying preclinical and clinical data now maintained confidentially at the time they are making enrollment decisions and after. Such data, material to both risks and benefits, and perhaps, eventually, even to the personalized suitability of a trial, would inform clinicians' and patients' discussion of research and nonresearch options for patients considering becoming research participants. States do not generally require covered trials to be within academic medical centers, which might be expected to promote results publications. Even if they did, in practice academic medical centers themselves have not consistently ensured that provisions for data transparency, disclosure, and independent safety monitoring are included in contracts with industry sponsors (28) (29) (30) .
The study also suggests that, even with a model like the MCD, it has been challenging for states to legislate, according to their unique political circumstances, at the complex intersection of biomedical research, medical practice, and health-care coverage. States have not kept legislative pace with legal changes, such as changes in required federal assurances, or environmental changes, such as the movement toward trial registries and publication or changing perceptions of the FDA and industry. Some state provisions suggest that the states are grappling with a subject that is unfamiliar to them, such as those provisions that require trial informed consent forms to include exculpatory language that is inconsistent with federal regulations prohibiting such waivers or provisions that, expressly or by omission, make IRB review optional as far as coverage is concerned. In 2008 and 2009-even though "multiple project assurances" had been eliminated by the federal government several years earlier, and influence of industry to FDA relations on trial results had recently swept through the press, one state enacted new legislation that required an IRB to have a multiple project assurance and several new state provisions continued to qualify studies based on FDA review without additional steps or assurances. No newly adopted state provision required results dissemination or assessed the broad impact of its coverage decisions. If there is any single trend across almost all states, it is that the standards of the MCD have been diluted. This suggests that there is a fragility to states' politics when it comes to insisting on independent assurances of quality in the face of competing, powerful industry forces representing payers, providers, and pharmaceutical companies. The fact that many states provided legal immunity from liability to payers-and imposed no obligations on industry sponsors, even with respect to trial-specific injuries like product defects-itself suggests that both payers and sponsors were influential in the process, even where patients, clinicians, and clinical researchers would have benefited from increased payer and sponsor accountability.
There are limitations to this study. The study was necessarily focused on the text of states' enactments, but interpretations and actual practices can deviate from laws and legislative visions, whether through interplay with other state-specific provisions not overtly related, inadvertence, defiance, poor enforcement, or a social vision that evolves in a different direction. It is also possible, in the case of ambiguities or outright disagreement, that clinicians, payers, and the legal community, as well as regulators, have settled on some set of alternative meanings, perhaps even diverse local meanings within a given state, reflecting either a consensus approach, the power of one payer or provider to impose its interpretation on others based on market conditions, or the limited power of any player to detect deviations from the mandate. (Researchrelated injuries, for example, may be covered in practice through the simple fact that their relationship to a research protocol is not evident to payers or to providers other than the ones conducting causally related clinical trials.) Also, as noted above, Medicaid program documents and government employee benefit plan documents for each state were outside the scope of this study; a definitive conclusion about coverage for these populations nationally would require additional research. Finally, this is a review of payment provisions. Experience teaches that we would be unwise to ignore the effect of payment on service delivery; however, we cannot assume that one is identical to the other. For all these reasons, as well as the deliberate exclusion of the distinct form of policy making through judges discussed above, this study's conclusions are not a guide to what occurs in practice, though they are suggestive; indeed, important research questions arise from this perceived gap.
Pivotal questions for further research, then, are why states have come to vary so substantially from each other, from the standards of the MCD, and from traditional and evolving ethical standards; and whether states with different coverage provisions have a differential impact on participants, clinicians, and research compared with states that lack such provisions. As noted, these are payment provisions: It would be telling to assess their impact on clinical and research practice and to identify any factors that mitigated or exacerbated issues attributable to the state provisions. This study suggests that research into the enrollment impact of mandates should recognize, as variables, the ways in which state provisions differ from each other and assess whether impact varies based on clinical setting, disease, or specialty. Research into states' additional standards for comparing clinical alternatives would be useful to address which trials these standards function to exclude. Whereas absence of scientific standards and some ethical standards may allow some weak trials to be covered, it may be that states' comparative standards exclude highquality trials in important areas of cancer clinical research.
In contrast to Medicare's nationally uniform approach, states' coverage is often locally unique, with most states having opted for coverage limited to routine care costs in treatment trials, imposed weak standards for scientific review and protection of human subjects, developed unique standards to police the boundary between standard care and trials eligible for coverage, and ignored developments such as posting trial results and calls for independent scientific review for all clinical trials. State provisions inevitably leave patients and clinicians with some retained financial risk, and raise questions about which trials are covered in practice at the same time that they complicate the effort to assess the practical impact of state cancer coverage mandates. If there is any "bright side" to this analysis, it is that the variety in state approaches provides a useful laboratory to assess and compare the impact of different state choices. Indeed, there is an especially rich menu of options to explore. That research is important to guide the next generation of coverage provisions, state or federal, so that coverage provisions can best meet their goals.
Turning finally to the question posed by the title of this article, do science and ethics matter, we must assume that to those who pursue legislation the answer is probably, in theory, a resounding yes, given the sustained effort any legislation requires, and proponents' necessary commitment to facilitating clinical trial participation and options for patients. Indeed, many enactments include novel requirements, gestures in the direction of trials being scientifically rooted, but without procedures that implement them or assure their relevance. For science and ethics to matter in practice, there will need to be closer, more exact communication between legislators and diverse members of the oncology community, including clinical researchers, on essential policy elements; procedures that ensure their sound implementation and integrity; data to help make choices; and a means to continually assess the effects on patients, clinicians, researchers, and the progress of medical knowledge. 
